

Further searchings of the mind do not contradict this idea but rather roll back further the ultimate source of divinity and power. The stuff of the universe which is in a certain sense the source of all the beings of the universe is of its very nature destined to be formed and shaped by some higher power itself above and outside of the imperfection of matter. In the constant epuration of the Greek concept of divinity this very logical march of reasoning may be followed, reaching its culminating point in the Nous of Anaxagora.

It remained, however, to delineate the attributes of the spiritual divinity thus progressively arrived at. In accomplishing this, Plato and Aristotle, whose achievements come as the crowning glory of the centuries of philosophic spade-work of their predecessors, are inevitably led to discern certain of the same indestructible divine characteristics in man, principally his power to reason, with its consequent capacity to order and perceive order and to grasp things eternal. From this divinity in man to the immortality of the spiritual part of man is but a logical step, obscure and faltering though it may be. Christianity, seconding the certitude of reason by the certitude of faith, will embolden man to step without misgiving into the eternal company of the gods.

Socrates, the teacher of Plato, has not much to say on immortality in the Apology because, as he says, "Whereas I know

but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know; but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil." (29) Thus, whether man is immortal or not, he is not therefore condoned for base acts because of the fear of death. On the other hand, obviously, if any man has a hope of immortality it will be he who has conducted himself justly in the present life. Socrates, primarily preoccupied with practical virtue as a necessary condition of any pretence to wisdom, does not consider immortality speculatively but rather is concerned with the concrete attainment of perfection by man which, of course, would be valid in whatever state man might find himself. He is careful to say that he does not know whether death is a good or evil (37). He even goes so far as to say at the end of the Apology, prompted by his oracle, that those who think death is an evil are in error (40). It is either a sleep bereft of all consciousness which the weary Socrates appears to consider a blessing, or it is another realm of just judgments "where they do not put a man to death for asking questions." In definite progress over the somber and lugubrious shades of Homer, Socrates says of the just dead: "Besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true." (41)

This magnificent exposition of the duties of a just citizen in the present life set forth by Socrates under the pen

of Plato is a fitting introduction to the speculations of the disciple on the life after death on the threshold of which Socrates stood, saying: "The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways - I to die and you to live. Which is better God only knows." (42)

That Plato's convictions upon the immortality of the soul were not common belief among his contemporaries is evident from the passage of the Republic where Socrates says to Glaucon: "Are you not aware that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?" To which Glaucon replies in astonishment, and says: "No, by heavens! And are you really prepared to maintain this?" (Rep. X, 606) The certitude of Socrates in the Republic, incidentally, quite other than the uncertainty of Socrates in the Apology, where Plato probably undertook to preserve the memory of the real Socrates, show the difference between the belief of the two men, or rather, the advance of Plato's belief over that of Socrates.

What is the immortal soul as conceived by Plato? The soul is like the unchangeable divine. "When returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging." (Phaedo 79). "The soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and

immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable." (80) The opinion of those who hold "that the soul... will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body" is rejected. The untainted soul departs "to the divine and immortal and rational." (81) Those, however, who are not completely purified from earthly traits are sent back to another body, higher or lower according to their state of perfection.

That Plato's ideas on the immortality of the soul had evolved during his own lifetime as a teacher is seen by Rohde, Krohn and Pflleiderer (II, 266) in the fact that the outline of the Republic as set forth in the beginning of the Timaeus is other than that which has actually come down to us. According to them-and they bring cogent reasons to their support-it was only after the Timaeus and after Plato had reached the full maturity and final development of his genius that he introduced the notion of immortality and a life after death into the Republic. In the first draft, civic virtue was made to be its own reward, the drunken immortality proposed by some is regarded with disdain (II, 365). It is only in the final draft, after Plato's thought is fully developed, that to the aims and virtues proposed to the citizens in general in Books III to V, there is proposed to the philosophers in Books VI and VIII (considered as interpolated), the necessity of striving, not for this short life, but rather for divine immortality as first hinted at in the end of the first draft (X, 908). It is in these final writings, Books VI and

VII, that Plato's concept of immortality appears in its most sublime form.

The dignity and incorruptibility of the soul in Plato's mind may be seen by the fact that while it is not one of the divine Ideas, nevertheless it is of all the images of the Ideas that which most resembles them (Phaedo 79). It is the body which retains the soul in the material world (Phaedrus 248) whither it has been plunged by its own fault. Life becomes a struggle to regain the vision of the divine essence (247). This is the goal of wisdom. "A man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; - this is the recollection of those things which the soul once saw in God - when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being (249).

However, should it appear that Plato's doctrine on the soul is purely a religious one, the result of a belief rather than of rational conviction, it is to be noted that Plato has a place for the immortal and divine soul in the world regardless of any moral considerations. The soul supplies the life, the self-motion of the world. As such it is necessarily immortal. "The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. ... And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of

motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth." (Phaedrus 245)

Although the soul is all that is spiritual and the body all that is unspiritual, and this deep rift exists between them, nevertheless their necessary association is an occasion for the body to exercise its downward pull upon the soul, and this is the reason for its defects. The three parts of the soul : mind, courage and appetite, remain associated even in the eternal life. "And so of the individual; we may assume he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State..." (Rep. IV, 435). However, as Plato continued to elevate his idea of the soul, he gradually sheared away from it all bodily association in its pure state. "... To see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity..." (Rep. X, 611).

What then is the highest reward of justice ? "Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue." (Rep. X, 613). Such is a truly noble delineation of the destiny of

man, one reminiscent of St. Paul (Rom. 8), far other than that which the materialists, no more clairvoyant than Plato, would wish to foist upon him. Though this may require many sojourns in the body, the final goal of freedom and life with God is the supreme endeavor.

Whether or not Plato's defense of the immortal soul is indebted more to religion than speculation, the very harmony with which such a concept fits in to a rational plan of the universe must have given him a growing certitude which enabled him to uphold as no philosopher had done before him the distinct identity and worth of the individual soul.

Fundamentally, for Plato the soul is immortal and divine because it grasps the immortal and the divine. If the soul were not apperanted to the Good, it could not grasp the Good, the Beautiful and all that is perfect and eternal. In its striving to know the eternal and immortal the soul has the surest proof within itself that it is likewise eternal and immortal. "We are a plant not of earthly but of heavenly growth. ... He who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth, and in so far as human nature is capable of sharing in immortality, he must altogether be immortal; and since he is ever cherishing the divine power, and has the divinity within him in perfect order, he will be perfectly happy." (Tim. 90) Today the

contemporary materialistic doctrines endeavor to force man into accepting that all his perfection must lie here below as an outgrowth of the increase of productivity, but this fundamentally crude and unreasoned endeavor to brutalize the intellect of man will always do violence to that innate striving for the immortal and eternal present in every man and so acutely felt by Plato.

Today the modern materialistic tyrant justifies all sorts of bloody repression and brutality in the name of future materialistic bliss. As Plato says : "You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance." (Georgias, 518) That was not the conclusion of Plato's plan for the ideal polity. What sort of men were his rulers to be ? "When they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation; the time has now come when they must raise the eyes of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; ... making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a

matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there ..." (Rep. VII, 540)

Possibly this will be the lot of the few, but it is the ideal of all. "Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth - in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her hour comes." (Phaedo, 115) Few men have subordinated themselves to the severe regime which Plato proposes and thus his dream remains largely untried. However, the materialistic side has nearly all the means at its disposal to essay its contrary plan, and the impending chaos seems about to become the indirect proof that Plato was right. Even with the advent of Christianity and its rigid strengthening of immortality, few writers relying purely upon natural resources have approached the nobility of the picture of man traced by Plato.

IX Aristotle

With Plato the theological aspect of Greek philosophy reached its highest point. His successors were to launch out upon

another trend. With the extension of the notion of the Greek state from the closely-knit cities, in which civic and religious duties more or less coincided, to the broad empire of Alexander, held together by a common admiration of Hellenic culture, so also the intellectual strivings of the Greeks were extended from the search of the divine component of the world to an investigation of all the aspects of nature. Aristotle, the greatest disciple of Plato and no doubt greatly influenced by him, was to invoke the immortality of the soul for natural rather than religious reasons.

Aristotle's teaching on the soul is begun in natural philosophy, where soul and body are considered as the substantial components of man, and completed in the treatises where the divine aspects of the soul are considered.

In previous times, life in the Greek politics was often a struggle, war with other cities was common, factions within the city were struggling for power. For a man with dreams of order like Plato, there was not much more for a man intent upon attaining peace and nobility of soul than to detach himself from a seething state of affairs that could not be mastered, and, while striving for the common good, to keep oneself free of the contamination of violence and injustice, but in the era of peace within Greece it was natural to wish to profit from all the concrete opportunities

which this era facilitated. For Aristotle the body is no longer the enemy of the soul but a concrete instrument in the service of the soul. "As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be destined to minister to some plenaty sphere of action. Thus the saw is made for sawing, for sawing is a function, and not sawing for the saw. Similarly, the body too must somehow or other be made for the soul, and each part of it for some subordinate function, to which it is adapted." (De Part. Anim. 645,b)

It is the soul which gives the form to the body, which gives it life. "It is the presence of the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature." (ibid. 641,a) When a soul departs, what is left is no longer a living animal." (ibid.) "The soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal." (De Anim. 413 a)

The soul and body are thus inseparable in a living being, just as the wax and the form imprinted in the wax (412 b). But just as the form of the wax can be destroyed by changing the disposition of the matter of the wax, so also in a brute, when the matter is no longer disposed for the soul, the soul departs. Where has it gone? Back into the potentiality of the matter

whence it had been drawn. It is no longer an actuality. It has ceased to exist.

But does the whole soul of man sink back into potentiality? No, only those functions which perform the operations of animal nature. There remains to be considered that part of the soul which is not in common with animal nature, which is the intellectual part, found in man alone. (De Part. Animal. 641 b,9) What of this intellectual part of the soul? "It seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers." (De anim. 413b) "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed.....Mind is no doubt something more divine and impassible." (ibid. 408 b)

Why is Aristotle led to posit the existence of this something imperishable and divine in man? It is because, besides the affections of the soul which are affections of the complex of body and soul, e.g. sensation there is one which is peculiar to the intellectual part of the soul without admixture of the body. Since there is this way of acting or being acted upon which is proper to the intellectual part of the soul, the soul will be capable of separate existence. (cf. 408 a) This action which is proper to the intellectual part of the soul is thinking. In order to think, the mind must be capable of receiving the object of thought

without being the object itself. "Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind, in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure of all admixture...

(429 a) For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none." ... Thus, "while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it." (429 b)

But "since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul." (430 a) In addition to minds which is able to become all things, there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things. Besides the $\eta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ there is also the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$.

Aristotle goes on to say : "Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms)." Thus Aristotle clearly teaches the immortality of mind. But what is meant by mind ? Is it only the active mind or is it the active and possible mind both ? The concluding passage seems at first glance to eliminate the passive

mind : "When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more : this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks." (430 a)

But Aristotle has already spoken of the possible mind as separable, having its operation without a corporeal organ, so it must be equally so with the active mind. But why then say that mind as passive is destructible ? This apparent contradiction may be solved by considering that the passive mind here meant is that part of the corporeal soul which is subject to sensible passions such as love and hate, memory, etc., and which perishes with the body. This part of the soul can be called mind insofar as it participates in mind by obeying it and following its motion. In this sense one may say that "mind as passive is destructible." Both the active and the possible intellect, however, are by their nature, separable, impassible, unmixed, the one in act by its substance, the other in potency. (Cf. Comm. S. Thomas in L. III De Anima Nos. 732, 742-745) Thus the whole mind, both the active and the possible intellect, is immortal.

St. Thomas, as he was to do at length against the Averroists, also takes pains to demonstrate that the active and possible intellect are to be considered parts of the same individual intellect. (Cf. De Unitate Intellectus, Contra Averroistas, ed. Mandonnet, pp.

35-50 and

Thus the whole mind i.e., both the

active and passive parts, would be considered immortal, indestructible.

But while Aristotle thus interpreted teaches both the immortality of the soul and its individuality, it must be conceded that this interpretation is by no means universal, since many commentators, both ancient and modern, have considered him to have taught the destructibility of the individual possible intellect and the impersonal divine immortality of the active intellect.

But whether impersonal or personal, whether comprised of the active mind or the active and passive mind both, Aristotle was impelled by his own reason to predicate the presence in man of something suprasensible, something immortal and therefore related to the divine. Whereas all things, as far as their nature allows, search to partake in the eternal and divine, and that is the goal for which all things strive, even if the continuation of their existence must be specific rather than individualized (De anim. 415 b, there lies upon man the special injunction to nurture the divine within himself. "If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything." (Eth. 1177 b)

In his work On the Soul and in the Metaphysics (De Anim. 408 b and Meta. 1070 a) Aristotle has concluded that that part of the soul which is mind, reason, is immortal and divine. Furthermore, this divine part of man is not at odds with the body; the two are to form a harmonious whole, a little world, in which the body exists for the perfection of the soul not as a detriment to it (cf. De Anim. 407 b and Phys. 252 b). In other words, for the first time, man as man has something immortal within him which is neither something foreign to him, nor a participation in a unique divine being which would make his own individuality a mere illusion. Even should the soul live on devoid of memory and reasoning, it nevertheless lives on as a substantial being, immortal and related to the divine. (De Anim. 450 a) It remained for St. Thomas to postulate infused species for the separated soul, which Aristotle clearly saw could no longer operate naturally.

Possibly this conception of a separated soul which has lost all the aspects of its human personality which by some is perceived in Aristotle would seem to make it hardly more noble and worthy than the languid shades of Homeric poetry. But that Aristotle's concept of the soul was far more vigorous and elevated may be seen by his outline of blessedness in the Ethics. Although he states explicitly that in the Ethics he is engaged in defining the perfection to be attained by men as men (Eth. 1101 a), that is, by men in this present life wherein soul and body are conjoined

and in which the question of life after death is not discussed, nevertheless he places the perfection of man in the development of that within himself which is immortal, which would seem capable of transcending death. "Whether it be reason or something else that is the element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness." (Eth. 1177 a) "Now he who exercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love and honor this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly." (Eth. 1179 a)

Thus, arriving at the peak of Greek philosophy, whose healthy rationalism and realism has always been taken as a model by subsequent philosophers, one is confronted with a distinct and unequivocal assertion of immortality. Possibly the place of the individual concrete man in this immortality remains obscure, but the destiny of man is certainly linked with the divine, the immortal. That man is a mere creature of clay who sinks back into the earth that bore him, there to be dissolved into dust and oblivion, is a

thought completely foreign to Plato and Aristotle. It is only with the advent of modern philosophy that in the name of enlightenment and emancipation all that is above man, that supreme and divine Goodness and Truth for which his soul instinctively yearns, the idea of a life that can rise above pure material necessity, is violently and brutally torn from his thoughts. His search for supreme truth and goodness is blocked at every turn and he is forced by all possible means, both physical and intellectual, to turn his gaze downward and seek his happiness in grovelling in the earth.

Chapter III

ST. AUGUSTINE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

The greatest Christian philosophers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, in their exposition of the natural doctrine of immortality for man, needed only to develop and clarify the heritage left them by the intellectual labor of Plato and Aristotle.

St. Augustine's arguments for the immortality of the soul are continuations of those of Plato in many ways. Thus in the Soliloquies one finds the immortality of the soul based upon the eternity of truth. The Second Book begins with the brief and beautiful prayer which is so well known: "Ratio: Itaque ora brevissime ac perfectissime quantum potes. Augustinus: Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te. Oratum est." Then Reason asks Augustine, of all the things he says he does not know, which would he prefer to know first. The answer is: "Utrum immortalis sim."

All that is in a subject, if it always remains, then it is necessary that the subject always remain. And all knowledge (disciplina) is in a soul as subject. Therefore the soul must always remain, if knowledge always remains. But knowledge is truth and truth, as reason has shown in the beginning of Book II,

always remains. Therefore the soul always remains, nor is the soul said to be dead (II, ch. 13)

As the First Truth is eternal and immutable, so all truth is eternal, and is found in the soul, rather than made or engendered. The eternity of truth is easily demonstrated by showing the incorruptibility of certain mathematical truths, such as the fact that a line drawn through the diameter of a circle is longer than any other line drawn across the circle. As to the presence of truth in the soul, even when it is not felt, St. Augustine has resort to an argument similar to the theory of reminiscence of Plato. Can one say that a man who is expert in music has lost this art when he is thinking only of geometry? The art of music remains obviously, even when its possessor is not conscious of it. Even when a matter is completely forgotten, it can be regained by someone asking questions on the subject. At least, when one has forgotten something, one remains able to identify knowledge dissimilar to that one has forgotten, which indicates that the original knowledge remains in some form. The modern theories of psycho-analysis can add little to this. St. Augustine concludes: "It is manifest that the soul, the mind, is immortal, and that all true reasons are hidden within her, although it may seem, either through ignorance or forgetfulness, that they are not had or are lost." (Lib. de Immort. Anim. cap. 4) The Averroists, on the contrary, will later teach that the truth of the proposition: "Man is a rational

animal" depends upon man's existence. Man, not God, becomes the first truth. Equally free of experience, he does not find the truth within himself, but creates it; and this applies to all truth.

However, for St. Augustine, the body is not the enemy of the soul and a stranger to it. The sundering of the two in death is violence and a harsh experience, jarring horribly on nature so long as it continues, till there comes a total loss of sensation, which arose from the very interpenetration of spirit and flesh. De Civ. Dei, XIII, 6) St. Thomas speaks of death in the same way, when he says that Christ was indignatus at the death of Lazarus. (In Joann. ch. 11, lect. 6) Aristotle defines fortitude as a virtue specially concerned with the peril of death. (Eth. III

Possibly the strongest argument in St. Augustine's mind, as it probably was in Plato's and Aristotle's, is the natural desire for immortality in man. "For when we see that they (men who are unfortunate) fear to die and will rather live in such misfortune than end it by death, is it not obvious how nature shrinks from annihilation?" (op. cit. II, 27) St. Augustine lauds the Platonists since they had the wit to see that the immortal soul can only be happy by partaking of the light of that God by whom both itself and the world were made. (ibid. I, 1) Indeed, all men desire to be happy, but no man can be happy if he is not immortal, since life, the very

condition of his happiness, would otherwise be taken from him. But of those who have endeavored to prove immortality from human reasoning, scarcely a few, and they endued with great abilities and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortal soul alone (De Trin. XIII,9). It is faith which justifies and ratifies this desire. On the other hand, an incomplete view of nature makes it illogical.

Just as St. Augustine was inclined to utilize the contributions of Platonist philosophy, so St. Thomas Aquinas utilized the contributions of the more concrete and less symbolical Aristotelian philosophy, a great part of his work being devoted to commentaries upon the various philosophical treatises of the Stagyrite. It is thus that he draws the logical conclusions from Aristotle's reasoning upon immortality. This may be seen by referring to his commentary upon the various passages of Aristotle already quoted.

Thus, from Aristotle's own principles he states the necessity of the permanent conjunction of the possible and active intellect. "Sed impossibile est illud, quo aliquid operatur formaliter, separari ab eo secundum esse. Quod ideo est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Sic igitur aliquid formaliter operatur per aliquid, si cum eo sit actu. Non autem fit aliquid cum aliquo ens actu, si sit separatum ab eo secundum esse. Unde impossibile

est quod illud, quo aliquid agit formaliter, sit separatum ab eo secundum esse (De Anim. III, lect. 7)." Since man is not always knowing, the necessity of the two intellects in the same man is clear. "Necesse est igitur in anima intellectiva esse has differentias: ut scilicet unus sit intellectus, in quo omnia possint intelligibilia fieri, et hic est intellectus possibilis; et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu, qui vocatur intellectus agens... (ibid. lect. 10)." That these two intellects are not substantially different but rather differ as act and potency in the same substance is evident from the necessary perfection of human nature. "Non enim homo esset a natura sufficienter institutus, si non haberet in seipso principia, quibus posset operationem complere quae est intelligere: quae quidem compleri non potest, nisi per intellectum agentem. Unde perfectio humanae naturae requirit quod utrumque horum sit aliquid in homine (ibid.)."

The consequent doctrine of the natural immortality of the intellective soul is succinctly stated in a following paragraph, commenting upon the words: "Separatus autem est solus hoc quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est." (430 a, 26) St. Thomas states: "Dicit ergo primo quod solus intellectus separatus est hoc quod vere est. Quod quidem non potest intelligi neque de intellectu agente neque de intellectu possibili tantum, sed de utroque, quia de utroque supra dixit quod est separatus. Et patet quod hic loquitur de tota parte intellectiva: quae quidem dicitur

separata, ex hoc quod habet operationem suam sine organo corporali... Dicitur autem perpetua, non quod semper fuerit, sed quod semper erit. Unde Philosophus dicit in duodecimo Metaphysicorum, quod forma nunquam est ante materiam, sed posterius remanet anima, non omnis, sed intellectus (ibid., lect 10)." Thus in the individual man, there is both an individual active and passive intellect, and they are by their nature, immortal.

The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the former elaborated by St. Augustine, find a harmonious completion in the elaboration of Aristotle's philosophy by St. Thomas. The doctrine of reminiscence finds an explanation in the Thomistic-Aristotelian doctrine that knowledge in act, even though it is derived from the quiddities of material things rendered intelligible by the active intellect, nevertheless, since it is originally potential in man, ultimately depends upon pre-existing knowledge in act. "Non fit aliquis sciens actu, inveniendū, neque discendo, nisi per aliquam scientiam preexistentem in actu: quia omnis doctrina et disciplina intellectiva fit ex praeexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in primo Posteriorum." (ibid., lect. 10)

As had Plato and St. Augustine before him, St. Thomas, in his commentary upon the Ethics of Aristotle, develops the implication of that innate tendency in man to strive for the eternally good and true which Aristotle had likewise noted, and which, apart from

its philosophical validity, remains as a constant challenge and refutation of those who would forcibly avert the gaze of man from divine horizons and make him seek his happiness in earthly destructible and unsatisfying morcels of contentment.

Commenting upon the words of Aristotle that human good is activity of the soul in accordance with virtue and in a complete life "for one swallow does not make summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy," St. Thomas says: "Hoc enim naturaliter appetitus habentis intellectum desiderat, utpote apprehendens non solum esse ut nunc sicut sensu, sed etiam esse simpliciter. Cum autem esse sit secundum seipsum appetibile, consequens est, quod sicut animal per sensum apprehendens esse ut nunc, appetit nunc esse, ita etiam homo per intellectum apprehendens esse simpliciter, appetit esse simpliciter et semper et non solum ut nunc (Eth. 1, lect. 10). Et ideo de ratione perfectae felicitatis est continuitas et perpetuitas, quam tamen praesens vita non patitur."

Is this desire to be in vain? No, says St. Thomas completing the statement of Aristotle that in the Ethics he is treating only of the happiness attainable in the present life. "Quia non est inane naturae desiderium, recte existimari potest, quod reservatur homini perfecta beatitudo post hanc vitam (ibid., lect. 1

It is true, the intellect is not wholly divine, since it is destined to be conjoined with a body in this life, yet it is what is most divine in us and has affinity, by its spirituality, with the pure spirituality of the divine (of. Eth. 1177a). Thus, in the contemplation of intellectual things, and principally divine things, will human happiness consist. Its pleasures are both pure and enduring, which is not the case when man is concerned with things beneath himself. Nor is this a solitary sort of life, since two together can both know and do more than if alone, one seeing what the other at the time perhaps does not see. This is the end for which men unconsciously strive for, the end which the materialists tend to render possible by their provision of material well-being, but which they nevertheless deny. They strive to give man leisure, but in turn wish to divert that leisure back to the very material necessities from which they so violently wish to emancipate man. In reality, all civil life is ordained to that peace and repose which would give man the opportunity of contemplating truth.

This indeed is the life that renders man like the gods. At the same time it is the life most proper to that intellectual creature which is man, and therefore the one which will render him most happy even in his earthly life. That such a life is not a vacuous one for man is evident from the fact that the supreme life of the divinity is precisely one devoid of all earthly activities. "By the consideration of his wisdom he does all things." (Eth. X,

lect. 10-13)

Is such a life, which is already a step towards immortality, a life requiring slavery of the workers so that the contemplative may have easy leisure ? On the contrary, few riches are required for a life of speculation. Too great possessions are merely an encumbrance adding further preoccupations. Rich men are impeded from many good acts because of many affairs and because of pride and a superabundance of wealth. The philosopher needs but little. However, the greater number judge of happiness only according to external goods which are the only ones they know. The wise man is most pleasing to God because he cultivates that which is most divine within him, namely his intellect. (Eth. X, lect. 10-13)

Thus the outstanding philosophers of Greece and the greatest minds in Christianity have been unanimous in proclaiming the soul of man immortal. In drawing up a plan of life they have had before their eyes this immortality of man which, deriving as it does from the immateriality of his mind, necessarily sets his goal above the purely material goods that greater productivity can furnish. Consequently they have set the happiness of man even in his earthly life in the striving to live according to the spiritual and divine within him since it is to the divine that he is linked by the immortality of his soul.

It is true that the modern materialistic philosophers,

whether naturalistic or socialist, aim at freeing man from earthly preoccupations such as seeking his food and fuel to the end of enabling him to cultivate himself. But what does this culture consist in? The answers are far from precise and are avoided by stating that the prime need is first of all to secure economic well-being, and this once secured, it will be time to decide what use of one's leisure will most develop human personality. But in the meantime, one postulate is made fundamental: man's soul is not immortal; he is forbidden to seek his happiness elsewhere than in the space-time world about him. Belief in the future life is incompatible with a scientific approach to man and nature (Selsam, Socialism in Ethics, p. 150). In subsequent pages the consequences of such a postulate will be set forth.